On April 22, 2026, Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court in Enbridge Energy, LP, et al., Petitioners v. Dana Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, on Behalf of the People of the State of Michigan, and concluded 28 U.S.C § 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day removal deadline cannot be equitably tolled. The Court illustrated based on the statute’s text, structure, and surrounding context, Congress did not intend for § 1446(b)(1) to be equitably tolled.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1446(b)(1), a party sued in state court generally has 30 days after receiving notice of the state-court action to remove the matter to federal court (provided there are grounds for such removal). In Enbridge, the petitioners (collectively Enbridge) waited 887 days after being served with the Michigan Attorney General’s state-court complaint before removing the case to federal court, far beyond §1446(b)(1)’s 30-day deadline. Enbridge argued that the District Court nevertheless had equitable discretion to toll §1446(b)(1)’s deadline and excuse its late filing. This Court disagreed.
The text of §1446(b)(1) speaks in strict, mandatory terms. It requires that a notice of removal “shall be filed within 30 days” of the defendant receiving either a complaint or summons, “whichever period is shorter.”
What the Court hones in on specifically, is the statute’s structure. The Court states “This Court has repeatedly held that an “‘explicit listing of exceptions,’” set forth in a detailed manner, strongly indicates “‘that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned, open-ended, ‘equitable’ exceptions into the statute that it wrote.’” Brockamp, 519 U. S., at 352; see, e.g., Arellano, 598 U. S., at 7. That is because “‘[i]t would be inconsistent with [a] comprehensive scheme’” that includes a default deadline and several exceptions “‘to extend [the deadline] still further through the doctrine of equitable tolling,’” outside of those specified exceptions. Arellano, 598 U. S., at 7. This “‘structural inference’” is “‘heighten[ed],’” moreover, if the “‘specific exceptions’” at issue already “‘reflect equitable considerations.’” Id., at 9.”
The exceptions discussed include:
- 1446(b)(3) – Congress provided that the ordinary 30-day deadline does not apply when a case at first appears unremovable, but a later pleading, motion, order or other paper reveals that it is (or has become) removable. In that case, the defendant has another 30 days to remove from “receipt” of the paper “from which it may first be ascertained that the case is . . . removable. This extension is limited, however, if the basis for removal is diversity of citizenship. Such “[a] case may not be removed under subsection (b)(3) . . . more than 1 year after commencement of the action, unless the district court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from removing the action.” §1446(c)(1).
- 1441(d) – For actions against foreign states, Congress specifically allowed “the time limitations of section 1446(b) . . . [to] be enlarged at any time for cause shown.”[1]
- 1441(e)(1) – For certain cases involving fatal accidents, removal generally “shall be made in accordance with section 1446 . . . except that,” as to timing, an action may be removed “at a later time with leave of the district court.”
Through the limited exceptions discussed above, Congress specified the cases in which it wanted to authorize equitable tolling. Thus, “allowing equitable tolling of §1446(b)(1)’s deadline would undermine Congress’s manifest interest in resolving threshold removal questions early and conclusively. Under the rule the Court adopts today, plaintiffs that sue in state court usually can be confident that, after §1446(b)(1)’s deadline has elapsed, the forum question has been put to rest and the case will proceed in the chosen court.”
Of note, this opinion only resolves the applicability of equitable tolling to §1446(b)(1) and leaves open the applicability of other equitable doctrines, such as waiver, forfeiture, and estoppel.
[1] Similarly applied for actions involving certain intellectual-property rights. See §1454(b)(2).